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Overview 
 Cloud Integration – Introduction and Approaches 
 API-based Integration: Use Case, Protocols, Practice 
 Proposed Approach 
 Integration in the Workflow 
 Discussion 
 Summary and Further Work 
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Cloud Integration – Introduction 
 Broad adoption of cloud paradigm ⇒ organizational data assets are 
increasingly getting transferred to and consumed from the cloud  
 Traditionally, integration assumes point-to-point or  
point-to-multipoint connections originating from organizational premises 
 What happens when this process starts from the cloud? 
 
 Integration Platform as a Service (IPaaS)  - a new approach that transfers 
the complete business process execution to the cloud 
 IPaaS defined by Gartner as: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
… a suite of cloud services enabling development, execution and 
governance of integration flows connecting any combination of on-
premises and cloud-based processes, services, applications and 
data within individual, or across multiple organizations 1) 
1) M. Pezzini and B. Lheureux. Integration platform as a service: moving integration to the cloud. Gartner, 2011. 
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Cloud Integration – Approaches 
 Typical integration scenarios: 
 Cloud to on-premises 
 Cloud to cloud 
 On-premises to on-premises 
 Resources are stored, transferred and processed entirely in  
the cloud, which becomes the central point of integration 
 Like standard data sharing, but: increased complexity, many actors 
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API-based Integration – Use Case 
 Organization owns the accounts at three clouds: iPaaS, Gmail, SalesForce 
 iPaaS (platform):  periodically checks, retrieves and processes email, creating 
the leads and contacts at Salesforce 
 Based on REST-API interactions, secured using OAuth 2.0 and access scopes 
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API-based Integration – Use Case 
 Authorization scope : abstract term, non-structured, out-of-the-band, opaque 
 Gmail: supports a limited set of static scopes 
 Able to read all emails and metadata in an account 
 There is no specialized view, data filtering, limitation on fields… 
 
Scope Meaning 
gmail.readonly Read all resources and their meta-data 
gmail.compose Create, read, update and delete drafts, 
including sending of messages and drafts  
gmail.send Sending of messages, without read or update 
privileges   
gmail.insert Inserting and importing messages  
gmail.labels CRUD of labels  
gmail.modify All R/W operations except perm. deletion of 
threads and messages   
https://mail.google.com/ Full access to the account  
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API-based Integration – Use Case 
 Authorization scope : abstract term, non-structured, out-of-the-band, opaque  
 Salesforce: in many cases full scope required 
 Able to perform a broad set of operations well beyond the required use case 
 Coarse-grained scopes - Least privilege principle? 
 Scope Meaning 
api Access to user’s account using API. Encompasses chatter_api scope  
chatter_api Access to Chatter API resources  
custom_permissions Access to the custom permissions in a client-associated organization 
full Full data available to the user. Encompasses all other scopes  
id Access to the identity URL service   
openid Unique identifier of user in OpenID Connected applications. Can be 
used to retrieve token conforming to OIDC specifications  
refresh_token Allows provision of refresh tokens to eligible users, enabling the 
client to interact with the resource in offline mode.   
visualforce Provides access to Visualforce   
web Allows to use the token on the web, incl. access to Visualforce pages  
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API-based Integration in Practice 
Coarse-grained OAuth 2.0 access scopes in practice (managing authorizations): 
 
 
 
Full access to any spreadsheet 
(GDocs), Calendar (GCal) or 
file/document (GDrive) 
9 IEEE/IFIP DISSECT 2016 ӿ Istanbul, April 29th 2016 
Issues and Challenges 
 Issues 
 Unilateral definition of security concepts, APIs, management interfaces 
 Manual and proprietary management of security functions 
 Tools or approaches cannot be reused (many-to-many) 
 
 Management of security requirements from the perspective of resource owner? 
 Interoperable: apply the same approach among different providers/platforms 
 Automated: support autonomous agents 
 Dynamic: allow dynamic definition of owners’ policies and clients’ requests 
 Granular constraints: restrict access to resources or their parts  
relevant for an activity – principle of least privilege 
 Contextual views:  enforcement and resource transformations based on a context 
 
 Goals 
 Enabling cooperative, dynamic and granular access management  
 Considering complex API-based interactions in cross-domain environments 
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Proposed Approach 
 Actors: 
 Service provider (SP): exposes the service, such as XaaS 
 Resource owner (RO): consumes services, outsources data and processing 
 Clients (C): consume the resources provided by SP and owned by RO 
 
 Steps: 
 Establish relationship with the common framework {SP, RO, C} [1] 
 Expose and consume model of services – resources and capabilities {SP, RO, C} [2] 
 Expose model of security policies {SP, C} [2] 
 Update and manage security policies {RO, SP} [3] 
 Request resources {C, SP} [4] 
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Exposing Services and Capabilities 
 Characterizing APIs exposed by service provider 
 Web-APIs – there is a broad range of RESTful approaches and models 
 Exposed APIs specific to provider’s use-cases, environment, data models, 
processes, with different maturity levels 
 Development and maintenance overhead: clients need to be developed and 
maintained separately for each service provider through the whole lifecycle 
 Hard-wiring: out-of-the band contracts, underlying semantic unknown 
 
 Service description 
 Lightweight model based on semantic interoperability layer 
 Modeling the resources and operations from security perspective  
 Relies on an external or common model to represent the exposed services,  
resources and operations that can be managed 
 Reusing existing blocks 
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Exposing Services and Capabilities 
 Core and domain-specific vocabularies 
 Core vocabulary  provides the general concepts  
 Can be reused to expose general concepts 
 Domain-specific  vocabularies extend the core, optional 
 Refine domain-related concepts 
 
 Categories and application of concepts: 
 Entity classes - represented in object hierarchies 
 Object properties - establishing relations between the entities 
 
 
 Next: excerpts of classes and properties 
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Entity Classes (Excerpt) 
 Service: 
 The primary point in service provider’s offer to clients 
 Class members denote different types of services that  
correspond to a particular use case 
 Examples: CloudService, EmailService, StorageService 
 
 Resource: 
 Class of entities exposed by a service, manageable and consumable 
 Represents entities at different levels of abstractions, allowing specification of the 
granularity of resource sharing and application of (pre)processing operations. 
 Examples: Object, Drive, Directory, File, Document, Media, Email, MsgBody, MsgHeader 
 
 Operation: 
 Operations are actions that can be executed on resources prior to their sharing 
 Effectively provide a resource view adjusted to a particular context  
 Examples: RemovePII, MaskPII, Encrypt, Mask 
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Object Properties (Excerpt) 
 
 Connect entity instances of different concepts, establishing relations 
 Behavioral and constitutional 
 Examples: 
exposes Entity that service exposes to clients using web API 
contains, isPartOf Relationships between entities stating constitutive 
(hierarchical) relationship between instances 
subClassOf An abstract description of possible inter-class relations 
type Class type of particular entity instance 
hasType Supported class specialization for exposed resources 
requestsAccess Used to relate an access requests with a service 
supportsOperation Denotes operations that can be executed on entity 
acceptsOperation Denotes operations that are accepted by the client 
acceptsSubtype Subtype of resources satisfying a client request 
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Exposing Services and Capabilities 
 Example model using core and storage vocabularies 
 Nodes are instances of concepts; labeling does not affect the workflow 
 Starts with CloudService, which exposes File and Directory 
 File may be further specialized (property) as a Document or Media 
 Prior to the delivery to the client, a Document can be subjected to operations  
involving encryption or removal of personally identifiable information 
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Security Policies Classes (Excerpt) 
 SecPolicy: 
 The primary point in the definition of security policies. 
 One policy contains one or more rules with associated combination algorithm 
 Similar to the concept of XACML 
 
 
 SecRule: 
 Defines a node used to connect policy subject, target, action, condition and 
obligation 
 
 PolicySubject: 
 States a range of subjects or their attributes 
 Integration of different access control models and mechanisms such as OAuth 2.0  
 Examples: RegisteredClient, TokenBearer 
 
 SecAction: 
 This class includes different actions that may be defined on a resource 
 Examples: ActionDelete, ActionRead, ActionUpdate, ActionCreate, ActionPatch 
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Security Policies Classes (Excerpt) 
 CombAlg: 
 Policy contains one or more rules with associated combination algorithm 
 Defines a range of algorithms applied in the process of making a policy decision 
 Examples: PermitOverride, DenyOverride 
 
 Context: 
 Establishes a range of conditions as multi-level classes whose instances may be 
evaluated in the process of making a policy decision 
 Examples: TimeContext, SystemContext, RiskContext 
 
 
 Obligation: 
 Defines a range of actions that may be applied in the process of policy 
enforcement, both in pre and post resource delivery stages.  
 May include resource transformation using operations provided in the scope of 
resource sharing model 
 Examples: LogPre, LogPost, CustomView, RemovePII 
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Exposing Security Capabilities 
 Example model using core and email vocabularies 
 Nodes are instances of concepts; labeling does not affect the workflow 
 Starts with SecPolicy, which refers to security rules and supported capabilities 
 The model is exposed for each endpoint or resource type separately,  
describing its specific capabilities 
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Defining Security Policies 
 Discovering policy model 
 Client (resource owner’s agent) fetches the model of policies applicable to  
particular resources or endpoints 
 The model represents a range of supported concepts (actions, subjects …) 
 These concepts may be reused to define security policy 
 
 Delivering the model 
 Embedding models with resources: retrieved together with resources by using web 
API endpoints and providing the models as separate descriptions 
 Separate policy endpoints: policy management is done using dedicated API 
endpoint 
 
 Managing the policy 
 Based on retrieved model, the client instantiates the policy by applying  
provided concepts and relationships 
 These policies are retrieved or applied separately for each resource or endpoint 
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Integrating in the Workflow 
 Limited proof-of-concept 
 Introduces additional management layer in existing OAuth 2.0 workflows 
 Transparent proxy between the service provider and the client 
 Complements OAuth 2.0 coarse-grained scopes by reducing the provided resource 
sets and enforcing client-specific resource view (resource transformation) 
 
 Workflow steps 
 Client requests the resource using existing token [1] 
 Main application provides resource by relying on a token scope [2] 
 Based on a registered resource set and annotation returned by service provider,  
proxy performs second layer of security enforcement and delivers the resource [3] 
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Discussion 
 Cross-entity messaging 
 Management of policies (RO), requesting resources (C), exposing models (SP) 
 Different possibilities: RDF or JSON-LD 
 JSON-LD - lightweight format, readable by humans (illustration at the bottom) 
 
 Integrating in existing environments 
 Using additional HTTP headers for models and descriptions 
 Using HTTP methods (e.g. OPTIONS) to retrieve the models 
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Discussion 
 Scalability and overhead 
 Per-resource or endpoint models and policies – scalable management 
 Low overhead for smaller models (transport or policy execution) 
 Separated vocabularies allow supporting different domains iteratively 
 
 Interoperability challenges 
 Not everything can be covered by a model 
 It is hard to provide a model for complex concepts or environments 
 Integrating it in practical scenarios – even harder 
 However: conceptualized as a bottom-up approach 
 Providers may extend existing or define own models 
 Reducing many-to-many to (partial) many-to-one mappings 
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Summary 
Questions and challenges 
 
 Cloud-based integration adds complexity by executing processes and  
connecting resources hosted at various organizations 
 Challenging management of security and privacy 
 Which resources and services are consumed by an organization 
 How to control resources and policies at different, distributed systems? 
 Automated management of security? 
 
 Centralized systems such as iPaaS are gaining significant power: 
 Can access client’s resources on many providers using broad access scopes 
 Multi-tenant environment: extrapolating that to all customers using iPaaS’s 
services 
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Summary and Future Work 
Summary 
 Our proposal aimed to advance interoperability of security management 
 Abstracting and modeling services, resources and policies 
 Following lightweight, bottom-up approach  
 Initial prototype was applied to extend management of existing OAuth 2 flows 
 
 
Further work 
 Extend vocabularies with additional domains, refine and improve existing 
 Investigate integration with other protocols (UMA, XACML)  
 Separate approach? 
 Mapping of concepts and policies (automated alignment) 
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Any questions? 
Thanks for your attention! 
